There has been a great deal of academic work undertaken recently that attempts to appraise the success of transitional justice (TJ) in various post-conflict states. However, there is little agreement on what counts as success and how it should be measured or judged. The other chapters in this book consider the extent to which Sierra Leone's TJ processes should be considered a success. I take a step back to focus instead on what we mean by 'success' when assessing the impacts of TJ efforts and to examine the problems involved in evaluating transitional justice. My aim is not to provide a definition of success, as to do so would be impossible, for reasons set out below. Rather, I hope to provoke readers to consider afresh what should count as TJ success and how it should be evaluated.
The Sierra Leonean case is regarded by many practitioners and scholars as a success for transitional justice: 'Sierra Leone represents one of the world's most successful cases of post-conflict recovery, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.' 2 In 2012, the US described Sierra Leone as 'one of the most stable countries in a volatile region'. 3 The country recorded a high real GDP growth averaging 5.3 per cent between 2007 and 2011, and the growth rate of the Sierra Leonean economy in 2012 was, at 15.2 per cent, faster than the rate recorded in any other sub-Saharan African state that year. 4 As well as a strengthening economy, Sierra Leone also shows signs of having a strong polity. The 2007 presidential elections saw the first peaceful handover of power from the ruling party to the opposition in the country's history and took place without the presence of the UN peacekeepers (who had been present in the 2002 election which extended the Presidency of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah). In 2012, the third general election since the end of the civil war was held, returning President Koroma and the All People's Congress to power. Again, it took place without significant civil unrest or violence. So Sierra Leone would seem to be, at least in terms of its topline democratic practices and its economic indicators, a successful case of post-conflict transition.
To what extent is this success due to the TJ mechanisms employed in Sierra Leone (the Special Court, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission [TRC], a reparations scheme, local justice initiatives and the Lomé amnesty)? Claims of TJ success should be relatively easy to analyse in this case. The mechanisms have now largely completed their work, a decade has passed since the end of the civil war and there is a great deal of published research on the efforts to bring justice to the country. Yet, as I will discuss below, there is surprisingly little agreement on what should count as success and whether those standards have been reached. This lack of agreement has significant consequences for what we should 'learn' from Sierra Leone and what we should seek to transpose to other post-conflict situations. There continues to be a substantial demand for policy-relevant research to use in future cases of countries emerging from conflict or authoritarianism. However, the current state of the literature even in a case that looks, at first sight, to be relatively clear-cut, should make TJ scholars modest in the advice they are willing to offer.
In the first half of the chapter, I identify the kinds of factors that are claimed (in literature on Sierra Leone and on transitional justice more widely) to demonstrate TJ success or failure. Outcomes are by far the most prevalent focus of research, but scholars also make claims about the mandates of institutions; processes of establishment and of functioning; involvement of, and reaction from, victims and affected populations; adherence to universal normative standards; and cost-effectiveness. I note conceptual and methodological challenges of each as I discuss them, then suggest (somewhat unhelpfully, having laid out an array of possible indicators of success) that the list of factors that could be analysed to judge TJ success should be expanded to include the political economy of transitional justice. Having outlined (and supplemented) the broad range of factors that might be thought to indicate success or failure, I examine, in the second half of the chapter, further key challenges in judging TJ success: the challenges of possibility; causality; temporality; aggregation; and generalisability. I conclude that four tools can assist in bringing about both the best forms of transitional justice in practice and the best evaluations of TJ programmes by scholars: deep engagement with contexts; mixed methods; reflexivity and political judgement.
